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Three studies on farmer cooperatives: heterogeneity, member participation and democratic decision making; Três estudos sobre cooperativas agrícolas: heterogeneidade, participação dos membros e tomada de decisões democráticas

Pozzobon, Daniela Maria
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 19/07/2011 Português
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36.58%
The main focus of this thesis is on how cooperatives can minimize both democratic and agency costs. In particular, the thesis examines how differences in the level of heterogeneity and member participation amongst cooperatives affect their management of these costs. The thesis is one of the first studies to empirically examine how cooperatives manage their decision making costs. The relationships amongst the key variables of the study are examined in three studies. First, we develop a measurement of heterogeneity based on a 'grouping' method, with the aim of showing the presence (absence) of a dominant group and the size of the minority group(s). Cooperatives are ranked from homogenous to more heterogeneous based on both cooperative and member characteristics. Five different types of cooperatives are identified. Based on these results, a model is developed that predicts a non-linear relation between heterogeneity and member participation. Second, we distinguish all conflicts of interests (horizontal, vertical and diagonal) which exist at the different levels of cooperative decision making. By doing so, we are able to obtain a more complete picture of the costs of cooperative decision making. We also examine a broader range of decision making costs than most studies...

Eficiência de uma empresa de serviços públicos em face do advento da agência reguladora sob a ótica da economia dos custos de transação; Efficiency of a utilities company in the face of the advent of the regulatory agency from the perspective of transaction cost economics

Rocha, Alba Valéria Moraes Amaral
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 28/09/2011 Português
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36.35%
Os setores de infraestrutura exigem investimentos intensivos de capital envolvendo significativos custos irrecuperáveis (sunk costs), entre outras características específicas que os tornam pouco atraentes aos investimentos da iniciativa privada. Apesar da concepção historicamente aceita de que a estrutura de monopólio garantiria uma maior eficiência nesses setores, nas últimas décadas o ambiente institucional tem sofrido mudanças importantes, entre as quais se destaca a provocada pelo advento da regulação. O presente trabalho se desenvolve em torno do tema da eficiência dos serviços públicos de saneamento básico. A partir do recorte dos serviços operacionais, busca-se verificar se o advento da agência reguladora provocou impacto no nível de eficiência dos mesmos. Para tanto, parte-se da premissa que as características das transações da organização em foco estão alinhadas com a abordagem da Economia dos Custos de Transação, constructo elaborado por Williamson (1985) que tem origem nas proposições dos institucionalistas da década de 1920, entre os quais destaca-se Coase. Os elementos-chave da Economia dos Custos de Transação (ECT) são os pressupostos comportamentais da racionalidade limitada e do oportunismo...

Determinants of differential pricing of equity classes in the Brazilian equity market

Saito, Richard
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.12%
We examine the differential pricing of equity classes between voting and non-voting shares in Brazilian listed companies with particular emphasis on privatized companies, and we discuss the role of majority control, liquidity, and governance issues that may influence these differentials over time. We include a brief discussion on the Brazilian corporate law system, its impact on controlling and minority shareholders, and the characteristics of the Brazilian privatization process, before proceeding to the econometric analysis. We find empirical evidence to support that liquidity is a major component for determining this differential pricing over time. Other variables, such as the ratio of non-voting equity to total equity, type of majority control, and changes in regulation signal the high level of agency costs between majority controllers and minority shareholders in explaining the differential pricing of equity classes.

A estrutura de financiamento das empresas não financeiras do PSI 20

Silva, Sónia Sofia Figueiredo Pais Januário da
Fonte: Escola Superior de Ciências Empresariais Publicador: Escola Superior de Ciências Empresariais
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado
Publicado em //2013 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.32%
Dissertação de Mestrado em Contabilidade e Finanças; dívida e o capital da própria empresa. A corrente tradicional que aparece com Durand, em 1952, defende que a empresa deve possuir uma estrutura óptima de capital que lhe permita minimizar o custo total do seu financiamento, aumentando desta forma o valor da empresa. MM (1958), contestam a corrente tradicionalista, e tendo por base um conjunto de pressupostos consideram a existência de um mercado perfeito, pelo que concluem que a estrutura de capital é indiferente para a determinação do valor da empresa. Em 1963 (MM) perante uma série de contestações a esta abordagem, fazem uma correcção ao artigo anterior e eliminam o pressuposto da não existência de impostos, admitindo assim, que os impostos têm influência sobre a estrutura de capitais da empresa. Tendo sempre como base o estudo de MM, que foi considerado pioneiro e a base do pensamento moderno, foram surgindo outros estudos, em que foram introduzidos novos factores que podem contribuir para a formação da estrutura de capitais da empresa. Entre estes encontram-se os impostos sobre as pessoas colectivas e singulares, as relações de agência, os custos de falência e a assimetria de informação entre outros. Na presente dissertação analisa-se a estrutura de financiamento das empresas não financeiras do PSI 20...

Individuals, persons and agency theory – contrasted views on social interactions at work

Lopes, H.
Fonte: Instituto Universitário de Lisboa Publicador: Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em 12/09/2014 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.16%
The paper draws on the distinction between the concepts of individual and person to show how management rhetoric addresses workers as persons whereas actual management practices organize work as if workers were opportunistic individuals. We argue that this paradox is partly due to the widespread influence of agency theory whose conception of the firm, based on the agency costs generated by the supposedly non-cooperative workers’ behavior, became an influential normative model. Our argument is that agency theory’s basic assumption powerfully contributed to further and legitimize the ongoing power shift from labor to capital. Major institutional changes in corporate governance regulation are required to make firms’ behavior consistent with their rhetoric.

Earnouts: The Effects of Adverse Selection and Agency Costs on Acquisition Techniques

Datar, Srikant; Frankel, Richard; Wolfson, Mark
Fonte: Oxford University Press Publicador: Oxford University Press
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.12%
We examine the effects of adverse selection and agency costs on the structure of the consideration offered in an acquisition. Specifically we investigate factors affecting the benefits arising from use of earnouts. We find that when targets have greater private information, consideration is more likely to be based on the future performance of the target. We also find an earnout is more likely to be used in an acquisition if the target is a smaller, private company in a different industry than the acquirer. In addition, earnouts are more likely to be used when fewer acquisitions take place within an industry and when targets are service companies or companies with more unrecorded assets. Finally, we compare the use of earnouts with the use of stock and find that financing considerations are a more important factor in the use of stock.

Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Chernenko, Sergey; Foley, C Fritz; Greenwood, Robin Marc
Fonte: Wiley Online Publicador: Wiley Online
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.38%
Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear all agency costs that they create and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We argue that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations may support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed subsidiaries in Japan. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.

Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of Debt in Multinational Restaurant Firms

Upneja, Arun; Dalbor, Michael C.
Fonte: FIU Digital Commons Publicador: FIU Digital Commons
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: application/pdf
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.44%
The purpose of this paper is to understand whether multinational restaurant firms (MNRF’s) have higher agency and expected bankruptcy costs. Given this expectation, this may have an impact on the amount of debt incurred by MNRF’s. Overall, the findings are consistent with the existing literatue in terms of the positive relationship between MNRF’s and agency and bankruptcy cost. However, it was found that MNRF’s also have more total debt. This is surprising given the higher agency and bankruptcy costs. The importance of this research is that there may be considerations other than agency and bacnkruptcy costs affecting the capital structure decisions of MNRF’s.

Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency costs of debt

Brockman, P.; Unlu, E.
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //2009 Português
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Abstract not available; Paul Brockman, Emre Unlu

Flexible Contracts

GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, Paolo
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
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This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract so as to realign his interests with those of the principal. The parties’ understanding of the possible circumstances in which actions will have to be chosen and their attitude towards risk and uncertainty play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis of these costs and the consequences for whether or not delegation is optimal. We determine and characterize the properties of the optimal flexible contract both when the parties have sharp probabilistic beliefs over the possible events in which the agent will have to act and when they only have a set of such beliefs. We show that the higher the agent’s degree of risk aversion, the higher the agency costs for delegation and hence the less profitable is a flexible contract versus a rigid one. The agent’s imprecision aversion in the case of multiple priors introduces another, additional agency costs; it again implies that the higher the degree of imprecision aversion the less profitable flexible contracts versus rigid ones. Even though...

Flexible Contracts

GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, Paolo
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.41%
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of delegation, primarily agency costs, versus their benefits, primarily the flexibility of the action choice. We first determine and characterize the properties of the optimal flexible contract. We then show that the higher the agent’s degree of risk aversion, the higher is the agency costs of delegation and the less profitable a flexible contract relative to a rigid one. When the parties to not have sharp probability beliefs, the agent’s degree of imprecision aversion introduces another agency cost, which again reduces the relative profitability of flexible contracts.

La lógica de las fusiones horizontales de empresas.

Pita Silvosa, Jonatan
Fonte: Universidade da Corunha Publicador: Universidade da Corunha
Tipo: Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.12%
Traballo fin de grao (UDC.ECO). Economía. Curso 2013/2014; [Resumen] El objetivo de este trabajo es triple. En primer lugar, se realiza una revisión teórica de los principales artículos cuyo fin sea explicar la lógica de las fusiones horizontales de empresas. En segundo lugar, se pretende analizar los efectos de las fusiones sobre los beneficios de las empresas fusionadas y el bienestar social. Por último, se pretende explicar los modelos que lograron reconciliar los resultados aportados por la teoría de la organización industrial con la evidencia empírica. La disciplina de la teoría de la organización industrial, aporta las modelizaciones de referencia que nos permitirán alcanzar casi todos los objetivos del trabajo. La estructura de los modelos que se presentan en el trabajo partirán de un marco de duopolio u oligopolio de Cournot, que se modificará mediante la instrumentación de estructuras de competencia escalonada. La competencia ―a la Stackelberg‖ es útil para analizar el comportamiento de las empresas afiliadas dentro de la empresa originada tras la fusión. Complementariamente, se utilizará en general la teoría del comercio internacional y en particular el modelo Ricardiano, para el estudio de algunos aspectos de las fusiones transfronterizas imposibles de explicar mediante la teoría de la organización industrial. En el trabajo se demuestra como se supera la paradoja de las fusiones mediante la consideración de la modificación que se produce en la estructura empresarial tras la fusión. En el análisis de los costes de agencia...

Roads to agency; Effects of Enhancing Women’s Participation in Rural Roads Projects on Women’s Agency

World Bank Group
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Working Paper; Publications & Research :: Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.46%
Infrastructure projects, and more specifically, roads construction, and maintenance are one of the core operations of the World Bank. However, despite the increase of gender mainstreaming efforts in transport projects little is known about the effects of these interventions on women’s agency defined as the ability to make effective choices and transform these choices into desired outcomes’. This study aims to bridge this knowledge gap. The study looks at the effects of women’s participation in roads construction and maintenance and rural economy promotion activities on women’s agency, which has recently become a focus of study at the World Bank. Through individual interviews and focus groups the study assesses the effects of women-targeted interventions in three rural transport projects in Argentina, Nicaragua, and Peru. By focusing on agency, the study sheds light on effects of gender mainstreaming interventions that have more lasting effects on gender equality given the catalytic value of agency on other gender outcomes such as economic opportunities and endowments. The report is structured as follows: section one gives introduction. Second section describes the gender dimensions and agency-enhancing approaches in transport projects and the gender approaches in project implementation in the selected case studies. The third section provides a summary of the methodology of the study. The fourth section describes the key findings of the qualitative research. The fifth section presents the lessons learned to inform future rural transport interventions. The sixth section provides concluding remarks.

Does a Country Need a Promotion Agency to Attract Foreign Direct Investment : A Small Analytical Model Applied to 58 Countries

Morisset, Jacques
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.32%
Establishing an investment promotion agency has become a central part of most countries' development strategies. Today there are more than 150 investment promotion agencies worldwide. Yet very little is known about what these agencies have been really doing, notably in emerging countries, and whether they have been effective in influencing investors' decisions. Using data from a new survey on 58 countries, Morisset shows that greater investment promotion is associated with higher cross-country foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, on top of the influence of the country's investment climate and market size. But this result has to be qualified on several counts. First, the effectiveness of the agency depends on the country's environment in which it operates. An agency in a poor investment climate is less effective at attracting investment. Second, the scope of activities that an agency undertakes influences its performance. Morisset's empirical analysis indicates that agencies devoting more resources on policy advocacy are more effective because such activity is not only beneficial to foreign investors but also to domestic investors. In contrast...

On common agency with informed principals

Lima, Rafael Coutinho Costa
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.4%
This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union...

A time series study of the effectiveness and costs of EPSDT outreach in Maine.

Jones, E; Nickerson, J M
Fonte: PubMed Publicador: PubMed
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //1986 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.41%
Maine's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program provides outreach and case management services through written agreements with 13 community-based agencies. These agencies are reimbursed on a cost-related basis for contacting new and re-eligible Medicaid families to inform them about EPSDT services and to enroll children in the program. Since October 1979, local agency outreach workers have attempted to inform 95 percent of the eligible families in their own homes. Effectiveness was measured by comparing the percentages of families informed with the 95 percent Federal requirement. Concurrently, but separately, agency costs were monitored. The authors undertook a study to determine the unit costs of informing families for 4 years and to relate those costs to the percentages of families informed. Using a single group time series design combined with a cost-effectiveness model, both effectiveness and efficiency were examined. The percentage of families informed increased 7.8 percent from State Fiscal Year (SFY) 1980 through SFY 84. The percent of increase per year, however, has decreased from 3.42 percent to 1.29 percent. The statewide informing unit cost decreased from $51.19 to $45.34 during the same time period. Examination of individual agency unit costs indicates that the difference between the lowest and highest agency unit cost is becoming greater each year. This study has reaffirmed the authors' belief that personal contact with families increases the likelihood of enrolling children in the program; less than 3 percent of the families informed of EPSDT services declined them.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off

Sitkoff, Robert H; Klick, Jonathan L.
Fonte: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. Publicador: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.28%
In July 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust announced a plan to diversify the Trust's investment portfolio by selling the Trust's controlling interest in the Hershey Company. The Company's stock jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale. But the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was then running for governor, opposed the sale on the ground that it would harm the local community. Shortly after the Attorney General obtained a preliminary injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale and the Company's stock dropped to $65.00. Using standard event study methodology, we find that the sale announcement was associated with a positive abnormal return of over 25% and that canceling the sale was followed by a negative abnormal return of nearly 12%. Our findings imply that instead of improving the welfare of the needy children who are the Trust's main beneficiaries, the Attorney General's intervention preserved charitable trust agency costs of roughly $850 million and foreclosed salutary portfolio diversification. Furthermore, blocking the sale destroyed roughly $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth, reducing aggregate social welfare by preserving a suboptimal ownership structure of the Company. Our analysis contributes to the literature of trust law by supplying the first empirical analysis of agency costs in the charitable trust form and by highlighting shortcomings in supervision of charities by the state attorneys general. We also contribute to the literature of corporate governance by measuring the change in the Company's market value when the Trust exposed the Company to the market for corporate control.

Agency conflicts, controlling owner proximity, and firm value: An Analysis of dual-class firms in the United States

Hoi, Chun-Keung; Robin, Ashok
Fonte: Blackwell Publishing Publicador: Blackwell Publishing
Tipo: Final Paper
Português
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46.07%
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The study seeks to understand whether the proximity of the largest shareholder (controller) to the locus of management - whether the controller is a top executive, a board member, or an outsider - determines the value of US dual-class firms. Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 209 US dual class firms from the year 2000 and a corresponding control sample of single-class firms, we run cross-sectional regressions to determine the effect of the controller on firm value. We present robust evidence that dual-class firm value is negatively related to controller proximity. Dual-class structure overall is unrelated to firm value, because despite its negative effects with high proximity controllers there appear to be benefits when controller proximity is low (when the largest shareholder is an outsider). Theoretical/Academic Implications: Ownership structure is a widely studied subject but most studies focus on insider ownership. More nuanced aspects of ownership such as controller proximity are needed in empirical studies and theoretical models. These nuances could help us better understand the interplay between the incentive of various parties (e.g., managers, large shareholders) and the opportunity available for extraction of private benefits. Practitioner/Policy Implications: A practitioner implication is that shareholder of high-proximity dual-class firms must seek additional control mechanisms to curb agency costs. A policy implication is that investor protection (laws and institutional structure protecting shareholders) works only to a limited extent - it curbs overt acts of expropriation...

A theoretical framework for corporate governance studies: agency theory assumptions; Arcabouço teórico para os estudos de governança corporativa: os pressupostos subjacentes à teoria da agência

Correia, Laíse Ferraz; Amaral, Hudson Fernandes
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; ; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/09/2008 Português
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46.21%
O propósito deste ensaio consiste em fornecer uma contribuição para o desenvolvimento e fundamentação da pesquisa em governança corporativa, mediante a apresentação dos pressupostos subjacentes à Teoria da Agência, que constitui um dos arcabouços teóricos mais utilizados nos estudos sobre o tema, mas que é, muitas vezes, abordado de forma incompleta. Assim, este trabalho buscou preencher um pouco essa lacuna nos estudos de governança, mediante a discussão dos principais pilares da Teoria da Agência, isto é, as suposições acerca do comportamento dos indivíduos nas organizações; a repartição das etapas do processo decisório, que se traduz na delegação de autoridade aos administradores (agentes); a importância do conhecimento específico; os custos de agência oriundos da distribuição do poder de decisão a indívíduos racionais, que detêm o conhecimento requerido pela organização; e os mecanismos de controle do comportamento dos administradores. A partir dos elementos essenciais dessa teoria, são desenvolvidos os mecanismos de governança corporativa, os quais visam melhorar a performance das firmas.; The agency theory, an important theoretical framework in the area of corporate governance, was discussed as a contribution for development of this subject. The foundations...

The sell-out right as an agency control mechanism.

Boizard, Matthias
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis
Tipo: Thesis; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2009 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.32%
This work seeks to demonstrate why current strategies aimed at limiting the exploitation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders in private companies are insufficient and argues in favour of the introduction of an agency theory-based control mechanism in the form of a sell-out right, under certain circumstances to be assessed in court. This stems from the observation that certain corporate governance failures are inherent in the very nature of the private company, which is dominated by an individual and/or a family or by a company acting as controlling shareholder when the private company is a subsidiary of a group of companies. Because of the divisive nature of the majority principle, ownership is separated from control in private companies, whether the company is majority owner-managed or managed by professional managers. Thus, much like public companies, private firms dominated by one single shareholder or by a group of shareholders are prone to agency costs resulting from adverse selection and moral hazard. We address throughout this work the specific agency problems arising in companies in which power is divided along a line separating controlling shareholders from non-controlling shareholders. Such agency problems are exacerbated in private companies because no market exists for the shares such that minority shareholders may be trapped in an irremediably adverse situation. We argue that a sell-out right is the best remedy to such agency costs.