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Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery

Verma, Prateek; Sengupta, Supratim
Fonte: Public Library of Science Publicador: Public Library of Science
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 23/07/2015 Português
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27.56%
Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery.

Firm Competitiveness and Detection of Bribery

Serafeim, Georgios
Fonte: Harvard University Publicador: Harvard University
Tipo: Research Paper or Report
Português
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27.71%
Using survey data from firms around the world I analyze how detection of bribery has impacted a firm’s competitiveness over the past year. Managers report that the most significant impact was on employee morale, followed by business relations, and then reputation and regulatory relations. The impact on stock price has been much less significant and this could be attributed to stock prices not reflecting the impact on employee morale and business relations in less competitive labor and product markets. To better understand these bribery cases I analyze detailed data on the identity of the main perpetrator, detection method and organizational response following detection and find that both the method of detection and how an organization responds are systematically related to the seniority or type of the perpetrator. Finally, I examine how these factors are associated with the impact on competitiveness and find that internally initiated bribery from senior executives is more likely to be associated with a significant impact on firm competitiveness. Bribery detected by the control systems of the firm is less likely to be associated with a significant impact on regulatory relations. Finally, bribery cases where the main perpetrator is dismissed are less likely to be associated with a significant impact on firm competitiveness. These results shed light on the costs of bribery after detection.

Nonuniform Bribery

Faliszewski, Piotr (1980 - )
Fonte: University of Rochester. Computer Science Department. Publicador: University of Rochester. Computer Science Department.
Tipo: Relatório
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.71%
We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al. [FHH06], where each voter has a single price for any change we may ask for. We show polynomial-time algorithms for our version of bribery for a broad range of voting protocols, including plurality, veto, approval, and utility based voting. In addition to our polynomial-time algorithms we provide NP-completeness results for a couple of our nonuniform bribery problems for weighted voters, and a couple of approximation algorithms for NP-complete bribery problems defined in [FHH06] (in particular, an FPTAS for plurality-weighted-$bribery problem).

How Bribery Distorts Firm Growth : Differences by Firm Attributes

Şeker, Murat; Yang, Judy S.
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
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37.26%
How corruption affects economic performance has been studied for over a decade. Yet the lack of detailed firm-level data has limited research regarding who is carrying the real burden of corruption. This study shows that for firms in the Latin America and Caribbean region, bribery significantly distorts firm growth. Firms that pay bribes when conducting business transactions -- such as applying for permits, electricity, or water connections -- have 24 percent lower annual sales growth than firms that do not face such solicitations. Moreover, these distortions are more severe for low-revenue-generating and young firms. Using the instrumental variables method, the authors show that these results are robust to different specifications and the use of different sub-samples.

Left Out of the Bargain : Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and Implications for Asset Recovery

Oduor, Jacinta Anyango; Fernando, Francisca M. U.; Flah, Agustin; Gottwald, Dorothee; Dorothee, Jeanne M.; Mathias, Marianne; Park, Ji Won; Stolpe, Oliver
Fonte: Washington, DC: World Bank Publicador: Washington, DC: World Bank
Português
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37.44%
Over the past decade, countries have increasingly used settlements—that is, any procedure short of a full trial—to conclude foreign bribery cases and have imposed billions in monetary sanctions. There exists a gap in knowledge, however, regarding settlement practices around the world and the disposition of these monetary sanctions—notably through the lens of recovery of stolen assets. Left Out of the Bargain , a study by the Stolen Asset RecoveryInitiative (StAR), provides an overview of settlement practices by civil and common law countries that have been active in the fight against foreign bribery.

Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control

Basu, Karna; Basu, Kaushik; Cordella, Tito
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.71%
The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle-blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash bargaining, detection is costly, and detection rates are set endogenously. First, when detection rates are fixed, the symmetry properties of punishment are irrelevant to bribery. Bribery disappears if expected penalties are sufficiently high; otherwise, bribe sizes rise as expected penalties rise. Second, when detection rates are determined by the bribe-giver, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either eliminates bribery or allows it to persist with larger bribe sizes. Furthermore, when bribery persists, multiple bribe sizes could survive in equilibrium. The paper derives parameter values under which each of these outcomes occurs and discusses how these could be interpreted in the context of existing institutions.

A New Cross-National Measure of Corruption

Escresa, Laarni; Picci, Lucio
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.64%
A new measure of cross-national corruption is constructed based on the geographic distribution of public officials involved in cross-border corruption cases. A comparison is made between the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI) and perception-based measures, considers the extent to which differences between them are driven by systematic factors, and concludes that they are not. As more data on cases of cross-border bribery incidents become available, the PACI will provide an increasingly valid cross-national measure of corruption.

Firm networking and bribery in China: assessing some potential negative consequences of firm openness

Huang, F.; Rice, J.
Fonte: Kluwer Academic Publ Publicador: Kluwer Academic Publ
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //2012 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.56%
Economic openness, both in terms of increased international trade exposure and enhanced inter-firm networking, has been a key element of China’s economic emergence since the implementation of market reforms and the "opening-up policy" over 30 years ago. Unfortunately, these changes have also coincided with the increased incidence of bribery and corruption. Both in general, and in the specific context of China, research on the relationship between a firm’s tendency toward openness and its propensity to engage in bribery is scarce. This study seeks to fill this gap based on empirical evidence provided by a large sample of Chinese firms. The findings of the study reveal that firms’ increased networking and openness tend to occur contemporaneously with greater bribery and corruption. We suggest that this may be due to the misuse of guanxi-based networks that coincide with the presence of firms’ open network strategies, heightened by the potential loss of resource and capability heterogeneity (and hence reduced competitive advantages) in the context of openness. We further find that firms paying bribes do so as an attempt to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic processes and ineffective institutional support that might tend to hinder their development.; Fang Huang and John Rice

The role of anti-corruption chapters within free trade agreemnts: governance of bribery within the legislature, judiciary and the public service

Molloy, Erin
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Relatório
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.98%
Corruption has experienced increased attention in recent years, spurred in part by an increasingly globalised market place. In particular, bribery of foreign public officials has become an important issue for governments, civil society and the private sector alike. Bribery in international transactions exists to the detriment of domestic economies and the international trading environment. Bribery impedes economic growth, undermines governing institutions, and results in ineffective administrative institutions, reduced citizen welfare and environmental degradation. The increased risk and expense created by bribery in international transactions also hampers the efficiency and economic development accorded by international trade liberalisation Bribery is a result of opportunities for economic rents, high levels of discretionary powers, inadequate transparency and a lack of accountability for both multinational firms and public officials. Bribery is therefore controlled by effective governance. Governance involves the integration of proactive and enforcing measures in governing institutions to foster integrity, increase transparency and enhance accountability. This report examine s governance of the institutions of public officials...

The role of attitudes, subjective norms, attributions, and individualism-collectivism in managers' responses to bribery in organizations: The case of Ecuador

Wated, Guillermo Camilo
Fonte: FIU Digital Commons Publicador: FIU Digital Commons
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.71%
The goal of this study was twofold: (1) to introduce a model explaining how attitudes, subjective norms, internal and external attributions about bribery affect the way managers' deal with bribery in organizations, and (2) to clarify the role of the individualism-collectivism cultural dimension in managers' attributions of employees' behavior related to bribery. Twenty-six internal and external attributions related to bribery were identified through a series of structural interviews with 65 subject matter experts, and then evaluated by three hundred fifty-four (n = 354) Ecuadorian managers. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that attitudes and external attributions significantly predicted managers' intentions to discipline employees' who accepted a bribe, and that those with a collectivist orientation were more likely to make external attributions of bribery. Implications for the eradication of bribery in organizations are discussed. ^

How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption

Dixit, Avinash
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
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This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The institution in this context comprises a no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in a community tribunal. The requirements such an institution must meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shown that an institution of sufficient quality -- combining probability of correct detection and severity of punishment -- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is not sufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state's formal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded, but increases the probability of winning the license or contract through bribery. An improvement in the government's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holding the private institution constant...

Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs : A Framework for Evaluation

Huther, Jeff; Shah, Anwar
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
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The anti-corruption strategy the World Bank announced in September 1997 defined corruption as the "use of public office for private gain" and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: 1) Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects; 2) Helping countries that request Bank assistance for fighting corruption; 3) Mainstreaming a concern about corruption in Bank work; and 4) Lending active support to international efforts to address corruption. The menu of possible actions to contain corruption (in both countries and Bank projects) is very large, so the authors develop a framework to help assign priorities, depending on views of what does and does not work in specific countries. Their framework, based on public officials' incentives for opportunistic behavior, distinguishes between highly corrupt and largely corruption-free societies. Certain conditions encourage public officials to seek or accept corruption: a) The expected gains from undertaking a corrupt act exceed the expected costs. b) Little weight is placed on the cost that corruption imposes on others. In a country with heavy corruption and poor governance...

Public Wrongs, Private Actions : Civil Lawsuits to Recover Stolen Assets

Brun, Jean Pierre; Dubois, Pascale Helene; van der Does de Willebois, Emile; Hauch, Jeanne; Jaïs, Sarah; Mekki, Yannis; Sotiropoulou, Anastasia; Sylvester, Katherine Rose; Uttamchandani, Mahesh
Fonte: Washington, DC: World Bank Publicador: Washington, DC: World Bank
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Publication
Português
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27.64%
Corruption and thefts of public assets harm a diffuse set of victims, weakens confidence in public institutions, damages the private investment climate, and threatens the foundations of the society as a whole. In developing countries with scarce public resources, the cost of corruption is an impediment to development: developing countries lose between US$20 to US$40 billion each year through bribery, misappropriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. Corruption is by no means a "victimless crime." This study aims to explore the standing of States and Government entities as victims and the possible recourse to private actions to redress public wrongs. States and Government entities may act as private litigants and bring civil suits to recover assets lost to corruption. The goal of this work is to promote knowledge and understanding as well as to increase the use of civil remedies and private lawsuits to recover stolen assets in the context of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) offences. The UNCAC...

How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru

Kaufmann, Daniel; Montoriol-Garriga, Judit; Recanatini, Francesca
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.56%
When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged...

Bribery: An Exploration of Uganda Perspectives

Mwanahewa, Sango A.
Fonte: Centre de recherche en éthique de l'UdeM (CRÉUM) Publicador: Centre de recherche en éthique de l'UdeM (CRÉUM)
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
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37.44%
Cet article examine le concept de pot de vin dans un contexte multiculturel. Le terme pot de vin n’existe pas toujours dans certains contextes africains. L’Ouganda, et plus spécifiquement Ankole, est pris comme exemple. Afin de donner sens au terme, une définition contextuelle et une différenciation doivent être proposées. De manière similaire, les termes d’éthique et de politique économique ont besoin d’un traitement contextuel. Par exemple, les codes éthiques peuvent-ils être universalisables ?la discussion suggère un déplacement de la nature et de l’impact de l’éthique et de l’économie vers les contextes dans lesquels ils opèrent.; This is an investigation of the concept of bribery in a multicultural context. It is possible that the term and concept “bribery” do not exist in some African contexts. Uganda is taken as the example and centre for this discussion, and in particular Ankole. In order for both the term and concept to make sense, there is need for contextual definition and differentiation. Similarly the terms Ethics and Economic Policies need a contextual treatment. For instance, can Ethical Codes be universalised? The discussion suggests a shift from concentrating on the nature and impact of Ethics and Economics to the understanding of the contexts where they operate.

Institutional framework and bribery in Latin America: The case of PetroTiger Ltd. and Ecopetrol S.A.

Siegel, Eyal
Fonte: Universidad EAFIT; Master in International Business (MIB); Escuela de Administraci??n. Departamento de Negocios Internacionales Publicador: Universidad EAFIT; Master in International Business (MIB); Escuela de Administraci??n. Departamento de Negocios Internacionales
Tipo: masterThesis; Tesis de Maestr??a; Caso; acceptedVersion
Português
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Due to different institutional interpretations, there is a broad set of perceptions and attitudes towards bribery and corruption. Especially in the international business context, it is not likely to have a uniform understanding and consensus regarding the interpretation and the handling of these behaviours. This paper analyses the corruption environment in Latin America. Based on analysing the specific case of the firm PetroTiger Ltd., which was engaged in bribery activities with the Colombian state-controlled firm Ecopetrol S.A. in 2010, this study finds characteristics of corruption in the Latin American region. This research distinguishes itself from the existing literature since it provides new insights in one specific region, including a broad set of dimensions and approaches. A compilation of desk research, media analysis and the Latin American Corruption Perception Index by the Transparency International underpins the corruption in this region. The primary findings show that the Latin American region differs from others because its level of perceived corruption is defined by its strong cultural influences, the internal economic drivers of Latin American firms, and the weak enforcement of legislation. Above all, this paper confirms that each region has its own characteristics and that the global perception on corruption is changing negatively. Taking this into account...

On the Hardness of Bribery Variants in Voting with CP-Nets

Dorn, Britta; Krüger, Dominikus
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
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27.56%
We continue previous work by Mattei et al. (Mattei, N., Pini, M., Rossi, F., Venable, K.: Bribery in voting with CP-nets. Ann. of Math. and Artif. Intell. pp. 1--26 (2013)) in which they study the computational complexity of bribery schemes when voters have conditional preferences that are modeled by CP-nets. For most of the cases they considered, they could show that the bribery problem is solvable in polynomial time. Some cases remained open---we solve two of them and extend the previous results to the case that voters are weighted. Moreover, we consider negative (weighted) bribery in CP-nets, when the briber is not allowed to pay voters to vote for his preferred candidate.; Comment: improved readability (especially of Theorem 2 and some misleading formulations), more detailed introduction and conclusion, several typos fixed

Frugal Bribery in Voting

Dey, Palash; Misra, Neeldhara; Narahari, Y.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 30/04/2015 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.94%
Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the notion of frugal bribery and formulate two new pertinent computational problems which we call Frugal-bribery and Frugal- $bribery to capture bribery without money in elections. In the proposed model, the briber is frugal in nature and this is captured by her inability to bribe votes of a certain kind, namely, non-vulnerable votes. In the Frugal-bribery problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only vulnerable votes. In the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem, the vulnerable votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint of the briber. We further formulate two natural variants of the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem namely Uniform-frugal-{dollar}bribery and Nonuniform-frugal-{dollar}bribery where the prices of the vulnerable votes are, respectively, all the same or different. We study the computational complexity of the above problems for unweighted and weighted elections for several commonly used voting rules. We observe that, even if we have only a small number of candidates...

How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?

Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane A.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.71%
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by a certain amount of bribing voters a specified candidate can be made the election's winner? We study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneous-vs.-nonhomogeneous electorate bribability, bounded-size-vs.-arbitrary-sized candidate sets, weighted-vs.-unweighted voters, and succinct-vs.-nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation (by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NP-complete but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of elections (including plurality, Borda, k-approval, and veto) known as scoring protocols, we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simple-to-evaluate condition that classifies every case as either NP-complete or in P.; Comment: Earlier version appears in Proc. of AAAI-06...

Nonuniform Bribery

Faliszewski, Piotr
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 30/11/2007 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.64%
We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al. [FHH06], where each voter has a single price for any change we may ask for. We show polynomial-time algorithms for our version of bribery for a broad range of voting protocols, including plurality, veto, approval, and utility based voting. In addition to our polynomial-time algorithms we provide NP-completeness results for a couple of our nonuniform bribery problems for weighted voters, and a couple of approximation algorithms for NP-complete bribery problems defined in [FHH06] (in particular, an FPTAS for plurality-weighted-$bribery problem).; Comment: 11 pages