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Sócio-sexualidade e desconto do futuro: mecanismo de alocação de investimentos e tomada de decisão; Sociosexuality and Discount of the Future: decision making and investment allocation mechanism

Ferreira, Jose Henrique Benedetti Piccoli
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 16/06/2009 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.22%
Seriam as estratégias de Desconto do Futuro e as Estratégias Sexuais resultante de um mecanismo cognitivo comum de alocação de investimento? O Desconto do Futuro referese ao fato das pessoas (e outros organismos) normalmente preferirem consumir e adquirir recursos de maneira mais iminente do que esperar por um futuro incerto, envolvendo comportamentos impulsivos e de risco (Daly & Wilson, 2001). As estratégias sexuais são um sistema integrado de adaptações que organizam e guiam a alocação dos esforços reprodutivos dos indivíduos. Influenciando como os indivíduos selecionam parceiros, no quanto investem nas esferas de acasalamento e parental, etc (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). As variações encontradas entre os sexos e os indivíduos nessas duas estratégias comportamentais são resultado da alocação diferencial de investimento parental. A existência comum de variação entre os sexos e individuais, assim como a correlação direta das duas estratégias apoiaria a existência de um mecanismo comum. No presente trabalho foram realizados dois estudos. No primeiro estudo foram encontradas somente para as mulheres, relações diretas entre as estratégias, em que mulheres mais descontadoras eram sexualmente mais irrestritas, além de variações comuns entre as estratégias e fatores ontogenéticos e comportamentais. No segundo estudo foram confirmadas a relação direta feminina e foi encontrada a mesma relação para os homens...

Budgeting and resource allocation in universities: a public choice approach

Silva,Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da
Fonte: Fundação Getulio Vargas, Escola de Administração de Empresas de S.Paulo Publicador: Fundação Getulio Vargas, Escola de Administração de Empresas de S.Paulo
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/12/2000 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
45.95%
The calls for colleges and universities to improve their productivity are coming thick and fast in Brazil. Many studies are suggesting evaluation systems and external criteria to control the quality of teaching and research in universities. Since universities and colleges are not profit-oriented organizations (considering only the legitimate and serious research and teaching organizations, of course), the traditional microeconomics and administrative variables used to measure efficiency do not have any direct function. An alternative would be to create an "as if" market control system to evaluate performance in universities and colleges. Internal budget and resources allocation mechanism can be used as incentive instruments to improve quality and productivity. It will be the main issue of this article.

Adaptively Parallel Processor Allocation for Cilk Jobs

Sen, Siddhartha; Agrawal, Kunal
Fonte: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 16407 bytes; application/pdf
Português
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The problem of allocating processor resources fairly and efficiently to parallel jobs has been studied extensively in the past. Most of this work, however, assumes that the instantaneous parallelism of the jobs is known and used by the job scheduler to make its decisions. In this project, we consider different ways of estimating the parallelism of jobs during runtime, as well as different ways of using this information to allocate processors in a fair and efficient manner. The goal of our project is to design and implement a dynamic processor-allocation system for adaptively parallel jobs. Adaptively parallel jobs are jobs for which the number of processors which can be used without waste—in other words, the parallelism of each job—varies during execution. We call the problem of allocating processors to adaptively parallel jobs the adaptively parallel processor-allocation problem. We propose to investigate the adaptively parallel processor-allocation problem for jobs running on a shared-memory multiprocessor (SMP) system. We focus on the specific case of parallel jobs that are scheduled with the randomized work-stealing algorithm, as is used in the Cilk multithreaded language (later, we will expand the scope of our research to include other kinds of parallel jobs). Our problem can be defined as follows: Consider an SMP system with P processors and J jobs. At any given time...

Do glucocorticoids mediate resource allocation in breeding tree swallows (Tachycineta bicolor)?

Dobson, Emily
Fonte: Quens University Publicador: Quens University
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.11%
All individuals allocate limited resources towards self-maintenance (meeting energy requirements for growth and development) and reproduction (producing and rearing offspring). Different physiological systems of the body attempt to balance these processes in order to maximize lifetime reproductive success. The precise mechanisms underlying adaptive allocation towards competing life history traits are unknown. One possible mechanism of mediating resource allocation is through the release of glucocorticoid (GC) hormones. Corticosterone (cort) is the primary GC found in birds, reptiles and amphibians and a good candidate for mediating shifts in resource allocation because (1) challenges that result in reduced energy availability, such as food limitation or disease, induce increased secretion of baseline cort, and (2) cort secretion can result in mobilization of energy stores. To investigate the effects of cort on resource allocation, we conducted two complementary studies in tree swallows (Tachycineta bicolor). First, we compared birds that received cort-implants with birds that received control-implants and un-implanted controls to identify causal effects of increased cort on resource allocation. We found no significant effect of implant type on measures of reproductive effort...

Assessing Fiscal Implication of the Recent Changes in Poverty Lines and Revision of Allocation Norms of Capital Expenditures and Resources for Targeted Programs

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.12%
There have been important changes in the budgeting process in Vietnam since 2006 when the government of Vietnam instituted a revolutionary reform in the management and allocation of the state budget. For the period of 2007-2010, the norms include ethnic minority population data, and poverty rates. The purpose of this research assignment is to describe the evolution of budgeting mechanisms in recent years, in association with capital expenditure transferred from central to provincial budgets. This report focuses on changes in the budgeting process and allocation norms. It is also assesses whether these recent changes are pro-poor, and how they would affect availability of resources for the national targeted programs.

Technical Note on the Methodology for the Allocation of Intergovernmental Grants in the Republic of Belarus

Timofeev, Andrey; Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Português
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46.04%
This technical note evaluates the methodology proposed by the Ministry of Finance for the allocation of transfers to subnational governments and suggest a number of alternative options for various grant design elements Overall, the framework laid out in the Budget Code and the implementation approach developed in the draft methodology conform to sound principles in fiscal decentralization and the best international practices. However, a number of elements of the methodology still need to be elaborated and some elements might need to be revised.

Coevolving a computer player for resource allocation games : using the game of Tempo as a test space.

Avery, Phillipa Melanie
Fonte: Universidade de Adelaide Publicador: Universidade de Adelaide
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Publicado em //2008 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.25%
Decision-making in resource allocation can be a complex and daunting task. Often there exist circumstances where there is no clear optimal path to choose, and instead the decision maker must predict future need and allocate accordingly. The application of resource allocation can be seen in many organizations, from military, to high end commercial and political, and even individuals living their daily life. We define resource allocation as follows: the allocation of owner’s assets to further the particular cause of the owner. We propose two ways that computers can assist with the task of resource allocation. Firstly they can provide decision support mechanisms, with alternate strategies for the allocations that might not have been previously considered. Secondly, they can provide training mechanisms to challenge human decision makers in learning better resource allocation strategies. In this research we focus on the latter, and provide the following general hypothesis: Coevolutionary algorithms are an effective mechanism for the creation of a computer player for strategic decision-making games. To address this hypothesis, we present a system that uses coevolution to learn new strategies for the resource allocation game of TEMPO. The game of TEMPO provides a perfect test bed for this research...

Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors

Guo, M.; Conitzer, V.
Fonte: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA Publicador: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA
Tipo: Conference paper
Publicado em //2010 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.13%
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and payment-free. Specificall, we focus on allocating multiple heterogeneous items between two agents with additive valuation functions. Our objective is to design strategy-proof mechanisms that are competitive against the most efficien (first-best allocation. We introduce the family of linear increasing-price (LIP) mechanisms. The LIP mechanisms are strategy-proof, prior-free, and payment-free, and they are exactly the increasing-price mechanisms satisfying a strong responsiveness property. We show how to solve for competitive mechanisms within the LIP family. For the case of two items, we fin a LIP mechanism whose competitive ratio is near optimal (the achieved competitive ratio is 0.828, while any strategy-proof mechanism is at most 0.841-competitive). As the number of items goes to infinit, we prove a negative result that any increasing-price mechanism (linear or nonlinear) has a maximal competitive ratio of 0.5. Our results imply that in some cases, it is possible to design good allocation mechanisms without payments and without priors.; Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer

Competitive repeated allocation without payments

Guo, M.; Conitzer, V.; Reeves, D.
Fonte: Springer; Berlin, Germany Publicador: Springer; Berlin, Germany
Tipo: Conference paper
Publicado em //2009 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.27%
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible mechanisms that do not rely on payments, with the goal of maximizing expected social welfare. We first focus on the case of two agents. We introduce an artificial payment system, which enables us to construct repeated allocation mechanisms without payments based on one-shot allocation mechanisms with payments. Under certain restrictions on the discount factor, we propose several repeated allocation mechanisms based on artificial payments. For the simple model in which the agents’ valuations are either high or low, the mechanism we propose is 0.94-competitive against the optimal allocation mechanism with payments. For the general case of any prior distribution, the mechanism we propose is 0.85-competitive. We generalize the mechanism to cases of three or more agents. For any number of agents, the mechanism we obtain is at least 0.75-competitive. The obtained competitive ratios imply that for repeated allocation, artificial payments may be used to replace real monetary payments, without incurring too much loss in social welfare.; Mingyu Guo...

Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

Santos, Agustín; Fernández Anta, Antonio; Cuesta, José A.; López Fernández, Luis
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart; info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
Publicado em /05/2014 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.15%
Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose use payments in order to deal with selfishness. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.; The proceeding at: Second International Conference,Networked Systems (NETYS 2014), took place 2014. May 15-17. in Marrakech, Morocco.

Emissions Trading with Offset Markets and Free Quota Allocations

Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Strand, Jon
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publicador: World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.19%
This paper studies interactions between a "policy bloc's" emissions quota market and an offset market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy "fringe" of countries (such as for the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol). Policy-bloc firms enjoy free quota allocations, updated according to either past emissions or past outputs. Both overall abatement and the allocation of given abatement between the policy bloc and the fringe are then inefficient. When the policy-bloc quota and offset markets are fully integrated, firms buying offsets from the fringe, and all quotas and offsets, must be traded at a single price; the policy bloc will either not constrain the offset market whatsoever, or ban offsets completely. These cases occur when free allocation of quotas is less (very) generous, and the offset market delivers large (small) quota amounts. Governments of policy countries would instead prefer to buy offsets directly from the fringe at a price below the policy-bloc quota price. The offset price is then below the marginal damage cost of emissions and the quota price in the policy bloc is above the marginal damage cost. This is also inefficient as the policy bloc, acting as a monopsonist, purchases too few offsets from the fringe.

A market based approach for resolving resource constrained task allocation problems in a software development process

Yilmaz, Murat; O'Connor, Rory V.
Fonte: EuroSPI Publicador: EuroSPI
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; all_ul_research; ul_published_reviewed
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.18%
peer-reviewed; We consider software development as an economic activity, where goods and services can be modeled as a resource constrained task allocation problem. This paper introduces a market based mechanism to overcome task allocation issues in a software development process. It proposes a mechanism with a prescribed set of rules, where valuation is based on the behaviors of stakeholders such as biding for a task. A bid process ensures that a stakeholder, who values the resource most, will have it allocated for a limited number of times. To observe the bidders behaviors, we initiate an approach incorporated with a process simula- tion model. Our preliminary results support the idea that our model is useful for optimizing the value based task allocations, creating a market value for the project assets, and for achieving proper allocation of project resources speci cally on large scale software projects.

Truthful and Fair Resource Allocation

Lai, John Kwang
Fonte: Harvard University Publicador: Harvard University
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.29%
How should we divide a good or set of goods among a set of agents? There are various constraints that we can consider. We consider two particular constraints. The first is fairness - how can we find fair allocations? The second is truthfulness - what if we do not know agents valuations for the goods being allocated? What if these valuations need to be elicited, and agents will misreport their valuations if it is beneficial? Can we design procedures that elicit agents' true valuations while preserving the quality of the allocation? We consider truthful and fair resource allocation procedures through a computational lens. We first study fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good, colloquially known as the cake cutting problem. We depart from the existing literature and assume that agents have restricted valuations that can be succinctly communicated. We consider the problems of welfare-maximization, expressiveness, and truthfulness in cake cutting under this model. In the second part of this dissertation we consider truthfulness in settings where payments can be used to incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private information. A mechanism asks agents to report their private preference information and computes an allocation and payments based on these reports. The mechanism design problem is to find incentive compatible mechanisms which incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private information and simultaneously compute allocations with desirable properties. The traditional approach to mechanism design specifies mechanisms by hand and proves that certain desirable properties are satisfied. This limits the design space to mechanisms that can be written down and analyzed. We take a computational approach...

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand

Guo, M.; Conitzer, V.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery; USA Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery; USA
Tipo: Conference paper
Publicado em //2008 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.33%
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in gen- eral, value flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG payments, which reduces the agents' utilities. In many settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the agents' utilities (taking payments into account). For this purpose, several VCG redistribution mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a large fraction of the VCG payments back to the agents, in a way that maintains strategy-proofness and the non-deficit property. Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. This results in a low total utility for the agents, even though the items are allocated efficiently. In this paper, we study strategy- proof allocation mechanisms that do not always allocate the items efficiently. It turns out that by allocating inefficiently, more payment can sometimes be redistributed, so that the net effect is an increase in the sum of the agents' utilities. Our objective is to design mechanisms that are competi- tive with the omnipotent perfect allocation in terms of the agents' total utility. We define linear allocation mechanisms. We propose an optimization model for simultaneously find- ing an allocation mechanism and a payment redistribution rule which together are optimal...

On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources

Christodoulou, George; Sgouritsa, Alkmini; Tang, Bo
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 24/07/2015 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.01%
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information. When agents' valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient, in contrast to the well-known 4/3 bound for pure equilibria. Next, we upper bound the PoA over Bayesian equilibria by 2 when agents' valuations are subadditive, generalizing and strengthening previous bounds on lattice submodular valuations. Furthermore, we show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple or scale-free mechanism. Then we switch to settings with budget constraints, and we show an improved upper bound on the PoA over coarse-correlated equilibria. Finally, we prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for pure equilibria in the polyhedral environment.; Comment: To appear in SAGT 2015

Multi-resource Fair Allocation with Bounded Number of Tasks in Cloud Computing Systems

Li, Weidong; Liu, Xi; Zhang, Xiaolu; Zhang, Xuejie
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.19%
Dominant resource fairness (DRF) is a popular mechanism for multi-resource allocation in cloud computing systems. In this paper, we consider a problem of multi-resource fair allocation with bounded number of tasks. Firstly, we propose the lexicographically max-min normalized share (LMMNS) fair allocation mechanism, which is a natural generalization of DRF, and design a non-trivial optimal algorithm to find a LMMNS fair allocation, whose running time is linear in the number of users. Secondly, we prove that LMMNS satisfies envy-freeness (EF) and group strategy-proofness (GSP), and analysis the approximation ratios of LMMNS, by exploiting the properties of the optimal solution. Thirdly, we propose a modified version of LMMNS, which is the second mechanism satisfying sharing incentive, EF, and GSP. Finally, we have implemented LMMNS, and show that it has a good average-case performance, especially when the number of resources is 2.

ART-GAS: An Adaptive and Real-Time GTS Allocation Scheme for IEEE 802.15.4

Xia, Feng; Hao, Ruonan; Cao, Yang; Xue, Lei
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 30/12/2011 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.15%
IEEE 802.15.4 supports a Guaranteed Time Slot (GTS) allocation mechanism for time-critical and delay-sensitive data transmissions in Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs). However, the inflexible first-come-first-served GTS allocation policy and the passive deallocation mechanism significantly reduce network efficiency. In this paper, we propose an Adaptive and Real-Time GTS Allocation Scheme (ART-GAS) to provide differentiated services for devices with different priorities, which guarantees data transmissions for time-sensitive and high-traffic devices. The bandwidth utilization in IEEE 802.15.4-based PAN is improved. Simulation results show that our ART-GAS algorithm significantly outperforms the existing GTS mechanism specified in IEEE 802.15.4.; Comment: The Asian Internet Engineering Conference (AINTEC 2011), ACM, November 2011, Bangkok, Thailand

Local public good provisioning in networks: A Nash implementation mechanism

Sharma, Shrutivandana; Teneketzis, Demosthenis
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 02/08/2012 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.24%
In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We consider networks where each user knows only that part of the network that either affects or is affected by it. Furthermore, each user's utility and action space are its private information, and each user is a self utility maximizer. This network model is motivated by several applications including wireless communications and online advertising. For this network model we formulate a decentralized resource allocation problem and develop a decentralized resource allocation mechanism (game form) that possesses the following properties: (i) All Nash equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism result in allocations that are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized resource allocation problem (Nash implementation). (ii) All users voluntarily participate in the allocation process specified by the mechanism (individual rationality). (iii) The mechanism results in budget balance at all Nash equilibria and off equilibrium.

Improving Federal Allocation of EQIP Funding

Gilbert, Emily; Liu, Jiemei; Qin, Jianming; Neal, Ashley
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Masters' project
Publicado em 25/04/2013 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.15%
The motivation behind this report is to evaluate and respond to past and current decision pathways employed for determining state allocation of the Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP] funding under the Natural Resource Conservation Service [NRCS]. We work to provide justifiable recommendations for how the allocation of EQIP dollars might be improved, especially as it pertains to improving equity among those states with the highest priority needs. The distribution mechanism of federal EQIP funding to each state has received significant criticism in the past. The criticism stems primarily from the usage of a weighted factor formula that has been thought to unfairly favor certain states over others. Beyond questions of equity, there have also been more fundamental concerns over the quality of data inputted into the funding formula. In this project, we worked with our client, a Program Analyst at the North Carolina NRCS office, to tailor our recommendations to the specific concerns of one state. Our client’s specific concern was that North Carolina has historically been positioned lower in the national ranking of EQIP funding that it receives as compared to many other large agricultural states. To better understand the process of federal EQIP allocation...

Computationally Feasible Approaches to Automated Mechanism Design

Guo, Mingyu
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação
Publicado em //2010 Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
45.95%

In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechanism design, the goal is to design procedures (mechanisms) for making the decision that work in spite of such strategic behavior, usually by making untruthful behavior suboptimal. In automated mechanism design, the idea is to computationally search through the space of feasible mechanisms, rather than to design them analytically by hand. Unfortunately, the most straightforward approach to automated mechanism design does not scale to large instances, because it requires searching over a very large space of possible functions. In this thesis, we adopt an approach to automated mechanism design that is computationally feasible. Instead of optimizing over all feasible mechanisms, we carefully choose a parameterized subfamily of mechanisms. Then we optimize over mechanisms within this family. Finally, we analyze whether and to what extent the resulting mechanism is suboptimal outside the subfamily. We apply (computationally feasible) automated mechanism design to three resource allocation mechanism design problems: mechanisms that redistribute revenue, mechanisms that involve no payments at all...