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- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- University of Limerick
- Proceedings of the 15th Computer Security Application Conference
- Proceeding IFIP TC11 WC11.8 First World Conference on INFOSEC Education
- Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
- Naval Postgraduate School
- Blackwell
- Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
- Informing Science and Information Technology Joint Conference
- Universidad Militar Nueva Granada; Facultad de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Especialización en Administración de Seguridad
- Universidade Cornell
- University of Cambridge; Faculty of Computer Science and Technology; Computer Laboratory; Microsoft Research Cambridge
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STP/HAMPI and Computer Security
Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 12/04/2012
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
573.93027%
In the past several years I have written two SMT solvers called STP and HAMPI
that have found widespread use in computer security research by leading groups
in academia, industry and the government. In this brief note I summarize the
features of STP/HAMPI that make them particularly suited for computer security
research, and a listing of some of the more important projects that use them.
Link permanente para citações:
What Should be Hidden and Open in Computer Security: Lessons from Deception, the Art of War, Law, and Economic Theory
Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 24/09/2001
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
583.54625%
"What Should be Hidden and Open in Computer Security: Lessons from Deception,
the Art of War, Law, and Economic Theory" Peter P. Swire, George Washington
University.
Imagine a military base. It is defended against possible attack. Do we expect
the base to reveal the location of booby traps and other defenses? No. But for
many computer applications,a software developer will need to reveal a great
deal about the code to get other system owners to trust the code and know how
to operate with it.
This article examines these conflicting intuitions and develops a theory
about what should be open and hidden in computer security. Part I of the paper
shows how substantial openness is typical for major computer security topics,
such as firewalls, packaged software, and encryption. Part II shows what
factors will lead to openness or hiddenness in computer security.
Part III presents an economic analysis of the issue of what should be open in
computer security. The owner who does not reveal the booby traps is like a
monopolist, while the open-source software supplier is in a competitive market.
This economic approach allows us to identify possible market failures in how
much openness occurs for computer security.
Part IV examines the contrasting approaches of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to the
role of hiddenness and deception in military strategy. The computer security...
Link permanente para citações:
Computer Security: Competing Concepts
Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Português
Relevância na Pesquisa
585.03895%
This paper focuses on a tension we discovered in the philosophical part of
our multidisciplinary project on values in web-browser security. Our project
draws on the methods and perspectives of empirical social science, computer
science, and philosophy to identify values embodied in existing web-browser
security and also to prescribe changes to existing systems (in particular,
Mozilla) so that values relevant to web-browser systems are better served than
presently they are. The tension, which we had not seen explicitly addressed in
any other work on computer security, emerged when we set out to extract from
the concept of security the set values that ought to guide the shape of
web-browser security. We found it impossible to construct an internally
consistent set of values until we realized that two robust -- and in places
competing -- conceptions of computer security were influencing our thinking. We
needed to pry these apart and make a primary commitment to one. One conception
of computer security invokes the ordinary meaning of security. According to it,
computer security should protect people -- computer users -- against dangers,
harms, and threats. Clearly this ordinary conception of security is already
informing much of the work and rhetoric surrounding computer security. But
another...
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