Israël est l’un des pays développés les plus féconds dans le monde et maintient un taux de fécondité stable depuis 1995. Il a échappé à la chute spectaculaire de la fécondité qui a été observée dans la plupart des pays occidentaux.
Le taux de fécondité était de 2,96 enfants par femme en 2009 (Statistical Abstract
of Israel, 2010, tableau 3.14). Le maintien d’une si forte fécondité pourrait être dû à l’immigration et à la “guerre démographique” qui sévit entre les différentes communautés vivant dans le pays (Sardon, 2006). Toutefois, on observe une différence significative entre les niveaux de fécondité des juifs d’Israël et de Cisjordanie depuis plusieurs années. Les études qui portent sur la fécondité en Israël sont faites au niveau national, ce qui ne fournit aucune explication sur cette différence. Pour ces raisons, l’étude de la fécondité en Israël mérite une attention particulière.
Ce projet vise à identifier les différents facteurs qui ont une incidence sur la fécondité des femmes juives vivant en Israël et en Cisjordanie. Il contribuera à une
meilleure compréhension des comportements liés à la fécondité de la population
juive de la Cisjordanie et peut fournir des indices sur les mécanismes complexes
qui régissent les relations entre Juifs et Arabes dans les territoires occupés.
Grâce aux données recueillies dans l’Enquête sociale générale de 2004 d’Israël...
This paper examines whether the son
preference and fertility behavior of Muslim couples respond
to the risk of inheritance expropriation by their extended
family. According to traditional Islamic inheritance
principles, only the son of a deceased man can exclude his
male agnates from inheritance and preserve his estate within
the nuclear household. The paper exploits cross-sectional
and time variation in the application of the Islamic
inheritance exclusion rule in Indonesia: between Muslim and
non-Muslim populations affected by different legal systems,
across men with different sibling sex composition, and
before and after a change in Islamic law that allowed female
children to exclude male relatives. The analysis finds that
Muslim couples more affected by the exclusion rule exhibit
stronger son preference, practice sex-differential fertility
stopping, attain a higher proportion of sons, and have
larger families than non-Muslims or Muslims for whom the
exclusion rule is less binding.
The aim of this paper is to study the
short and long-term fertility effects of mass violent
conflict on different population sub-groups. The authors
pool three nationally representative demographic and health
surveys from before and after the genocide in Rwanda,
identifying conflict exposure of the survivors in multiple
ways. The analysis finds a robust effect of genocide on
fertility, with a strong replacement effect for lost
children. Having lost siblings reduces fertility only in the
short term. Most interesting is the continued importance of
the institution of marriage in determining fertility and in
reducing fertility for the large group of widows in Rwanda.
Although reproductive health advocates
consider family planning programs the intervention of choice
to reduce fertility, there remains a great deal of
skepticism among economists as to their effectiveness,
despite little rigorous evidence to support either position.
This study explores the effects of family planning in
Ethiopia using a novel set of instruments to control for
potential non-random program placement. The instruments are
based on ordinal rankings of area characteristics, motivated
by competition between areas for resources. Access to family
planning is found to reduce completed fertility by more than
one child among women without education. No effect is found
among women with some formal schooling, suggesting that
family planning and formal education act as substitutes, at
least in this low-income, low-growth setting. This provides
support to the notion that increasing access to family
planning can provide an important, complementary entry point
to kick-start the process of fertility reduction.
The report consists of three parts:
global trends in fertility, contraceptive use and unintended
pregnancies; studies of two regions (Africa and Eastern
Europe/Central Asia) and two countries (Nigeria and
Kazakhstan) on the costs of fertility regulation behaviors
and provider attitudes towards contraceptive use. Fertility
levels have declined steadily over the last three decades
but the pace of decline varies among regions. Countries that
have achieved a high level of contraceptive use have reached
a lower fertility level. A gap continues to exist between
actual and desired family size, resulting in unintended
pregnancies. More than one-third of the pregnancies that
occur are unintended and one in five pregnancies ends in
induced abortion. Almost half of all induced abortions are
unsafe, and the proportion of all abortions that are unsafe
have increased during the last decade. Sixty-six percent of
unintended pregnancies occur among women who are not using
any method of contraception. Investing in quality family
planning programs is a cost-effective way to address unmet
need for contraception and reduce the risks of unsafe
In Turkey, female employment and
education are still relatively low, while fertility levels
are high compared with other European countries. However,
Turkey stands just at the edge of an important social
transition. Increasing female education and employment come
along with important decreases in fertility. By mobilizing
census and survey data, this paper finds that fertility
decreases are mainly caused by fewer transitions to a third
birth. Graduate women participating in the formal labor
market are most at risk of deciding against child arrival in
comparison with inactive or unemployed women. The third rank
is particularly concerned, as women’s income contribution
seems to be crucial for many families that already have two
children, and the arrival of a third child risks reducing or
stopping women’s working activities in the absence of
institutional childcare support. Policies enabling women to
combine work and family life, which have been proven
effective in other European countries, emerge as useful to
avoid a further fertility decline below replacement level in Turkey.
This paper uses the first wave of HILDA in an analysis of the determinants of fertility, focusing in particular on the role of education. Estimating lifetime fertility from micro data sets is generally quite difficult since a large proportion of the sample, because of their age, will have incomplete fertility. The HILDA survey allows this problem to be addressed, however, because as well as measuring the actual number of children a person has, there is also information on the additional number of children a person expects to parent. Thus it is possible to estimate the determinants of fertility in three dimensions: the actual number of children a person has, the expected future number of children, and total intended lifetime fertility, the sum of the first two. The analysis is conducted in several stages. First, total intended lifetime fertility is modelled as a function of education and a host of other variables reflecting the opportunity costs and consumption elements of child rearing. The HILDA sample allows control for a host of other factors, reflecting both attitudes and values, and their roles are examined as well. The main result is that education lowers total lifetime fertility, although the strength of this relationship falls importantly with the addition of a range of variables...
This paper aims to describe a wide range of policies that might be used to stop or reverse the downward slide of fertility rates. In advance, however, several points need to be made: 1. Low fertility exists in countries with widely differing institutional structures. Policies to support fertility must work from these pre-existing structures. For example, if child care provided by low-wage, undocumented immigrants is a factor related to higher fertility rates in the United States, this does not mean that this is a policy to be recommended for Sweden which has a long-established, high-quality, state-subsidised child care system. In other words, there can be no single cross-national model for success. Each country must seek its own institutionally-appropriate approach. Also, each country must deal with the realities of its own political economy. Strategies will not be accepted if they are not supported by the populace. For example, while I argue that changes in the level of gender equity within the family are an essential element of a fertility strategy in any country, family organisation is fundamental to cultural identity and revolutionary change is rarely a possibility (McDonald 2000a; McDonald 2000b). 2. Second, as far as possible...
Paper to be presented at the IUSSP Seminar on
‘International Perspectives on Low Fertility: trends, theories and policies’,
Tokyo, March 21–23, 2001.; Examination of fertility rates in Australia indicates a fall over time in both period and cohort fertility. Period total fertility has been below replacement level for twenty-five years, while cohorts completing their fertility in the first decade of the 21st century are likely to have around replacement-level fertility. Policy-makers and others in Australia are concerned about the potential for further fertility decline, given the impact this would have on population age structure and growth rates. This paper tests the hypothesis that the recent fall in fertility is due solely to changes in age-specific first-birth rates, resulting from delayed parenthood and increased levels of childlessness. Age- and parity-specific fertility rates for the period 1991–98 are constructed. These show that recent fertility declines are driven by changes in first- and second-birth rates, rather than first-birth rates only, while rates for higher order births remain relatively constant. One implication of this is the increasing prevalence of childlessness and one-child families in Australia. The author uses the 1991–98 age- and parity-specific fertility rates as the basis of four different projections of fertility. The likelihood of each of these projections given past trends in fertility is considered.; no
Introduction: Concern with below-replacement fertility first emerged in Europe in the 1930s. At the end of a steep decline in marital fertility that had begun in most of western and central Europe in the last third of the 19th century, total fertility fell below two in several countries, and in many urban areas, even in countries whose national fertility remained above replacement level. This was a cause of great alarm to governments wherever it occurred, raising the spectre of absolute declines in population size in the near future (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). Dire economic and political consequences were predicted for countries whose populations failed to replace themselves (Reddaway 1939). The postwar baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s generally erased such fears, but they have returned, albeit in somewhat less strident form, over the last two decades. Ever since the 1930s the concern with low fertility has been strongest within developed countries and especially in Europe. The theoretical frameworks used to explain such low fertility have been, therefore, almost exclusively oriented towards conditions in the rich world. Today however, we are rapidly moving into a world in which below-replacement fertility is common in both developing and developed countries. As is shown below...
International stereotypes tend to portray Iran as a ‘traditional’ society resistant to many aspects of social change. Based on this assumption, the generally held view is that Iran is experiencing one of the highest fertility rates in the world, and that demographic transition has not started yet. Recent statistics has proved, however, that the reality is profoundly different. Iran has experienced an astonishing fertility decline in recent years. This study aims to review the trends and changes in fertility over the period 1976 to 1996. The Islamic Republic of Iran experienced a moderate increase in fertility during 1976-1986, mainly due to the relaxation of family planning programs by the government. On the other hand, fertility began to decline in 1984, and has sharply declined since 1988. The question has arisen to what extent this significant change has been due to the changes in nuptiality and marital fertility. The own-children data from the 1986 and 1996 censuses allow us to analyse the change in fertility in the last two decades, and to decompose the change in fertility into two main components of nuptiality and marital fertility. The result has shown that around 85 percent of the changes is due to marital fertility...
This study exploits a natural experiment
to investigate the impact of land reform on the fertility
outcomes of households in rural Ethiopia. Public policies
and customs created a situation where Ethiopian households
could influence their usufruct rights to land via a
demographic expansion of the family. The study evaluates the
impact of the abolishment of these pronatal property rights
on fertility outcomes. By matching aggregated census data
before and after the reform with administrative data on the
reform, a difference-in-differences approach between reform
and non-reform districts is used to assess the impact of the
reform on fertility outcomes. The impact appears to be
large. The study estimates that women in rural areas reduced
their life-time fertility by 1.2 children due to the reform.
Robustness checks show that the impact estimates are not
biased by spillovers or policy endogeneity.
In the past the identification and explanation of spatial variations in fertility was seen as an important contribution to the field of population geography. By the 1980s with the substantial declines in fertility and the ' end ' of the demographic transition came the belief low fertility equated with little variation between groups and across space. Recent evidence however suggests the interaction of various factors including place - specific factors has led to spatio - temporal changes in fertility that have not been expected based on theoretical and national patterns of fertility.
The objective of this thesis was to investigate if spatial differentials in fertility still exist, and have relevance in a low fertility setting. The study examines the geography of fertility in the State of South Australia from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s using unpublished issue data from the 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1996 Australian Censuses for women aged 45 - 49 years and 15 - 44 years. In addition to identifying the patterns trends towards convergence or divergence in the patterns over time and the reasons for the patterns were also identified.
The findings of this study indicate strong spatial variations in fertility still exist, have persisted over time and there are localised conditions which temper overall expectations from theory. While it is assumed declines in fertility equate with a convergence in differentials...
In 1996, four provinces of Iran experienced below replacement level fertility. Since the early 1980s, these provinces have recorded lower fertility than the national level. How and under what condition has fertility declined to such a low level in these provinces? It may be of considerable interest to examine whether these provinces can be regarded as the leaders of the fertility transition in Iran. What are the likely effects of below-replacement fertility on population growth in Iran in the short term? Will Iran, as a whole, experience below replacement fertility in the near future? What would be the reaction of the government if below-replacement level fertility is reached in the near future? This paper will first, assess and analyse the fertility trends in the provinces of Isfahan, Gilan, Semnan and Tehran as compared with the national level during the period 1972-1996. Using available data, an attempt will also be made to estimate recent fertility levels for these provinces. Second, demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as contraceptive use, in these provinces will be reviewed; female singulate mean age at marriage and age-specific proportions married for 1976, 1986 and 1996 will then be examined. Third...
This research explores contemporary features of Indigenous fertility in the Northern Territory of Australia, the country's third largest state with the smallest total population, but with the largest proportion comprised of Indigenous peoples. The research exploits births data from a range of data sources to investigate whether Indigenous fertility trends in the Northern Territory over the past 20 years are a characteristic of stalled demographic transition. The research rests on three hypotheses: that Indigenous fertility trends in the Northern Territory were themselves an artefact of the data used to calculate the fertility rates; that there has been stalled demographic transition and the fertility declines documented for Northern Territory women during the 1960s and 1970s have not been maintained into the 21st century; and that contemporary Indigenous childbearing is characterised by universal, young mothering but not high parity.
A conceptual framework was developed that captures the myriad factors that affect Indigenous fertility outcomes to provide a context within which the research results could be understood. A three-stage approach was then used to examine Indigenous fertility trends. Firstly, a detailed analysis of the collection processes for the quantitative data available for this research was undertaken...
Completing additional years of education
necessarily entails spending more time in school. There is
naturally a rather mechanical effect of schooling on
fertility if women tend not to have children while
continuing to attend high school or college, thus delaying
the beginning of and shortening their reproductive life.
This paper uses data from the Kenyan Demographic and Health
Surveys of 1989, 1993, 1998, and 2003 to uncover the impact
of staying one more year in school on teenage fertility. To
get around the endogeneity issue between schooling and
fertility preferences, the analysis uses the 1985 Kenyan
education reform as an instrument for years of education.
The authors find that adding one more year of education
decreases by at least 10 percentage points the probability
of giving birth when still a teenager. The probability of
having one's first child before age 20, when having at
least completed primary education, is about 65 percent;
therefore, for this means a reduction of about 15 percent in
teenage fertility rates for this group. One additional year
of school curbs the probability of becoming a mother each
year by 7.3 percent for women who have completed at least
This paper examines the relationship
between international migration and source country
fertility. The impact of international migration on source
country fertility may have a number of causes, including a
transfer of destination countries' fertility norms and
an incentive to acquire more education. It provides provide
a rigorous test of the diffusion on of fertility norms using
original and detailed data on migration. The results provide
evidence of a significant transfer of fertility norms from
migrants to their country of origin: a one percent decrease
in the fertility norm to which migrants are exposed reduces
home country fertility by about 0.3 percent for origin countries.
Following a decade-and-a-half stall,
fertility in Rwanda dropped sharply between 2005 and 2010.
Using a hierarchical age-period-cohort model, this paper
finds that the drop in fertility is largely driven by cohort
effects, with younger cohorts having substantially fewer
children than older cohorts observed at the same age. An
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is applied on two successive
rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey. The findings
show that improved female education levels account for the
largest part of the fertility decline, with improving
household living standards and the progressive move toward
non-agricultural employment being important secondary
drivers. The drop in fertility has been particularly salient
for the younger cohorts, for whom the fertility decline can
be fully explained by changes in underlying determinants,
most notably the large increase in educational attainment
between 2005 and 2010.
Previous research on sex-selective
abortions has ignored the interactions between fertility,
birth spacing, and sex selection, despite both fertility and
birth spacing being important considerations for parents
when deciding on the use of sex selection. This paper
presents a novel approach that jointly estimates the
determinants of sex-selective abortions, fertility, and
birth spacing, using data on Hindu women from India's
National Family and Health Surveys. Women with eight or more
years of education in urban and rural areas are the main
users of sex-selective abortions and they also have the
lowest fertility. Predicted lifetime fertility for these
women declined 11 percent between the 1985-1994 and
1995-2006 periods, which correspond to the periods of time
before and after sex selection became illegal. Fertility is
now around replacement level. This decrease in fertility has
been accompanied by a 6 percent increase in the predicted
number of abortions during the childbearing years between
the two periods...
In this dissertation, I examine at the aggregate and individual levels, why contemporary fertility preferences diverge from actual fertility. I use three waves of cross-sectional survey data from the National Family Health Surveys from India (also known as the Indian Demographic and Health Surveys), fielded in 1992-3, 1998-9 and 2005-6 to investigate the disjuncture between preferences and behavior. The first empirical chapter outlines and operationalizes a new framework to decompose the incongruence between stated preferences and actual fertility into a set of parameters, such as unwanted births, gender preference and postponement of births to later ages, each of which varies in its level and intensity between societies and over time. By delineating the societal constraints that women do not incorporate in their childbearing intentions, this model provides a useful framework to explain variability in fertility in contemporary intermediate- and low-fertility populations. Equally important, the framework provides avenues to enquire into the fundamental structural and cultural correlates producing differences between family size preferences and actual fertility.
Subsequent empirical chapters explore various aspects of fertility preferences in detail. The second chapter probes a key socioeconomic correlate of individual-level fertility preferences...