This report concerns the Financial
Sector Advisory Centreapos;s (FinSAC) attempt to shed light
on the regulations and practices in the areas of identifying
and provisioning for loans losses in 26 countries in the
Emerging Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region. FinSAC aims
to deliver policy and technical advice and analytical
services to client ECA countries. This reportapos;s analysis
is based on a World Bank Survey conducted from 2011 to 2012
on banking supervision. Even though it is often stated that
Non Performing Loans (NPL) ratios and provisions are not
easily comparable across jurisdictions, NPLs and their
provisions in the European and Central Asian (ECA) region
are frequently charted and analyzed across multiple
jurisdictions. As a result of the lack of harmonized
regulations in this area, concerns regarding the consistency
of loan quality assessments are frequently raised,
particularly with respect to the distinction between
performing and non performing exposures, provisions for non
The Australian corporate insolvency and personal bankruptcy regimes are separate. In recent
ears, it has been suggested the two procedures should be merged. Those favouring merger believe it
would increase efficiencies, reduce existing overlap and lessen costs. The benefits of a single
insolvency regulator are noted as one particular benefit of merged insolvency legislation. Such
arguments in support of merger underestimate the difficulties associated with unification given the
tradition of separate insolvency laws within Australia and the terms of the Constitution.
Significant costs would be associated with merging insolvency and bankruptcy legislation and the
reduction of two governmental insolvency regulators to one. The Commonwealth may be unable o enact
merged insolvency legislation that included all existing insolvency provisions given limitations
within the Constitution. These limitations do not appear to have been addressed by those arguing in
favour of merged insolvency procedures.
The corporate insolvency and personal bankruptcy procedures have similar objectives and procedures.
Both provide for the appointment of an independent entity to ascertain the debtor's abilities,
realise their assets and distribute the proceeds among creditors. Further...
The global financial crisis has
uncovered a number of weaknesses in the supervision and
regulation of cross border banks. One such weakness was the
lack of effective cooperation among banking supervisors.
Since then, international bodies, such as the G-20, the
Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee have
actively promoted the use of supervisory colleges. The
objective of this paper is to explore the obstacles to
effective cross border supervisory information sharing. More
specifically, a schematic presentation illustrating the
misalignments in incentives for information sharing between
home and host supervisors under the current supervisory
task-sharing anchored in the Basel Concordat is developed.
This paper finds that in the absence of an ex ante agreed
upon resolution and burden-sharing mechanism and
deteriorating health of the bank, incentive conflicts
escalate and supervisory cooperation breaks down. The
promotion of good practices for cooperation in supervisory
colleges is thus not sufficient to address the existing
incentive conflicts. What is needed is a rigorous analysis
and review of the supervisory task-sharing framework...